

GCMUN'25

Committee : *League of Legends*

Agenda : *Rising US-China Tensions: Implications
for Global Arms Control and Multilateral
Stability*

LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to League of Legends, which will continue to serve as the GCMUN'25 flagship committee.

As you step into this committee, I ask you to pause and think about the world you're entering. As tensions escalate between the United States and China, the fragile balance of global power is on the brink. This is a **Continuous Crisis Committee**, where every second counts. Be prepared to think, act, and react with speed and strategy. Every directive could trigger a response. Every delay could cost your side dearly.

It's fast-paced, unpredictable, and constantly evolving. You'll need to think quickly, respond strategically, and most importantly, act responsibly. Your role here goes far beyond representing your country—it's about leading during one of the most serious crises the world could face.

Here's what we expect from you:

- The committee will move fast. Be alert, pay attention, and participate actively.
- Know your country's stance, past policies, and interests. A strong delegate is a well-read delegate.
- Diplomacy, alliances, media, warfare—every tool is available. Use them wisely.
- Bold ideas are welcome, but they must be grounded in political and practical reality.

You'll face difficult decisions. You'll be forced to weigh national interest against human suffering, military strength against global diplomacy. And you'll do all of this in a room that doesn't stop moving.

Most importantly any points you shall propose in the committee through your speeches or directives they shall have a singular intent, that is to secure and further national interest of respective states. However, any and all decisions will have short-term and long-term implications, which shall be taken into consideration before taking any decisions.

This committee will test more than your knowledge. It will test your ability to lead under fire, to build fragile consensus amidst mistrust, and to weaponize diplomacy as global stability hangs by a thread.

We, as your Executive Board, are here to guide, support, and challenge you through every twist in this crisis. We look forward to seeing how you rise to the occasion.

With highest expectations,

Paarth Veturkar

Chairperson

Shanay Shukla

Vice Chairperson

Committee Functioning

The League of Legends will convene as a **futuristic committee**.

Throughout the committee, updates will be provided, and member states are expected to utilize **crisis tools and mechanisms** (*directives, communiques*). The Executive Board will continuously analyse the impact of all communications, directives, and necessary actions implemented.

Any and all directives that would be sent by you shall be evaluated in its realistic sense and will be passed or failed on the degree of realism and detailing it holds.

The start point for the committee will be May 1, 2030, at the same time, there might be a crisis update 0, which might be dropped either on the day of the conference or a night before the conference, in order to simulate the crisis in much efficient manner.

This crisis simulation is based on the baseline scenario of a potential US-China tensions around the Multinational Military Collisions. To effectively safeguard their national interests, countries may find it necessary to adopt actions that extend beyond the immediate scope of this crisis. The committee acknowledges that such circumstances may arise and will allow for these actions when deemed essential. It is also understood that any action, whether military or non-military, may encounter opposition. Delegates should consider these potential obstacles when formulating and deciding upon their natural course of action.

There is **no end document** in this committee as it is a **continuous crisis committee** where realistically we as the fraternity of the League of Legends will not have time to formulate keeping in mind the necessity of the moment.

Documentation / Decisions

Your reaction to a situation expresses itself through three tools that you can use: *Overt Directives, Secret/covert Directives, Communiqués*

- i. **Overt Directive:** As the representative of a state, you can send in a directive to the EB, highlighting what you want your nation to do next in light of the crisis and recent updates. Two or more countries can also send in a Joint Directive. This is generally used to show support for a delegate's plan of action and to provide military or any other support for them as well. The EB will have complete discretion over whether or not to pass the directive. The EB can also decide if the committee will be voting on it. This will be decided based on the nature of the directive. The best directives are those that are not just approved by a large majority of the committee, but that also prove that a representative (or a bloc) has in-depth knowledge of the situation.
- ii. **Secret/Covert Directive:** It is of the same nature as a directive except that the content of the directive is not communicated to the committee. The outcome of the directive is, however, communicated to the committee. This can include anything from troop positioning to assassination orders.

Overt/ Covert Directive 1.0

To: The Executive Board

From:

Primary Objective:

Secondary Objective: (Optional)

Mission Briefings (Rough Outline)

Plan of Action (As detailed as possible)

Parties/Departments Involved

Additional Information (if any)

Kindly note: *Any and all final outcome of the document shall be determined by the means of the **'Primary and Secondary Objective'** that will be written in the document. Thereof, the directive how far drafted meticulously, the intent/objective shall be predetermined clearly.*

*Also, there is no limitation on the minimum page but the maximum page limit of directive is **3 pages** which can be drafted; however, a good directive shall incorporate a proper plan of action and clear objective.*

- iii. Communiqués: Communiqués are messages from the entire committee, a group of countries or an individual to another country, organization, person or group of people who **are not present in the committee**. These facilitate dialogue with relevant actors in a crisis. Communiqués often include negotiations, threats, and requests for aid or support but are not limited to the above-stated.

Sender: [Country/Position]

Recipient: [Country/Position]

Content: Clearly outline the message, specifying any requests, conditions, or warnings.

Example:

Sender: UK

Recipient: USA

Content:

We recommend initiating joint military exercises in the Baltic Sea to demonstrate our readiness in light of recent Soviet manoeuvres. Coordination between our naval forces is essential to deter any further encroachments into Western Europe.

Introduction to the Agenda

At the current timeline i.e., 1 May, 2030, the **global balance of power** is on fragile ground. The **United States** and the **People's Republic of China**, the world's two largest economies and leading military powers, are locked in a strategic rivalry that spans across oceans, cyberspace, outer space, and trade routes. What began as competition has now escalated into a geopolitical standoff with military, economic, and diplomatic consequences.

The post-Cold War arms control architecture—comprising treaties like the **Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)**, **New START**, and various **confidence-building mechanisms**—was designed for a bipolar world. That world no longer exists. Today:

- China refuses to join bilateral nuclear agreements like New START.
- The US has accused China of rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal, with projections showing over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.
- Hypersonic missile systems, anti-satellite weapons, and dual-use platforms are proliferating across both sides, eroding the effectiveness of traditional verification regimes.
- Strategic ambiguity in the Indo-Pacific, South China Sea, and even the Arctic is fuelling arms races, especially among regional actors like India, Japan, and Australia.

While forums such as the United Nations Security Council, Conference on Disarmament (CD), and the IAEA exist to uphold collective stability, rising US-China tensions have paralyzed decision-making due to vetoes and geopolitical bloc formation, undermined trust in arms transparency and inspection regimes, sparked fears of bloc-based arms buildups, especially as Russia increasingly aligns with China in defiance of Western norms.

At the given time, a miscommunication or miscalculation involving US and Chinese forces could trigger direct military confrontation or collapse in global arms control frameworks could result in a new arms race, pulling in nuclear-armed and non-nuclear states alike. As multilateral diplomacy has weakened, individual nations may choose to rearm, violate treaty obligations, or seek alliances outside the existing international system.

We have simplified the agenda for the given point to the baseline subset of a *Multinational Military Collision*, which will serve as a **triggering point** for the committee and we will be using it to **kickstart** the crisis. This is important to do as in a crisis committee with such a broad theme, it is challenging to simulate the crisis from the perspective of the Crisis Director as well as the Delegates. At the same time, the delegates in the committee while drafting the plan of actions by means of directives may shift the main confrontation or angle of crisis to any other region of conflict or part of world, as they may feel it feasible to do so.

Military and Non-Military Assumptions

In a futuristic committee such as this one, set in the period between **May 2030**, the world has changed in ways that may not yet be fully visible in our present reality. As such, delegates are permitted to make **military and non-military assumptions** when drafting directives and proposing actions, so long as these assumptions are logical, grounded in real-world trends, and internally consistent. The goal of this liberty is *not to encourage speculative fantasy or science fiction*, but to allow delegates to account for plausible technological advancements, geopolitical shifts, and structural changes that align with the evolving nature of global conflict and diplomacy. The assumptions you make are the **foundation of your directives** they must support your actions and be defensible when challenged by others in committee.

Starting with military assumptions, delegates may assume the *continued development and limited deployment of advanced weapons systems and strategic capabilities* that are currently in **testing or pre-deployment stages** (as of 2024–2025). These may include **hypersonic glide vehicles, autonomous drone swarms, directed energy weapons (such as lasers for missile defence), and electronic warfare platforms** capable of jamming enemy radar, communications, or even satellite networks. Additionally, you may assume the operational use of **space-based surveillance systems, low-orbit satellite jamming devices, and AI-assisted battlefield decision-making systems**, especially by technologically advanced militaries like those of the US and China.

Delegates can also incorporate developments in cyberwarfare, such as the presence of advanced state-backed hacker groups capable of disabling missile command systems, GPS networks, or critical infrastructure. Beyond weaponry, assumptions may extend to expanded military alliances or forward deployments. For example, by 2030 it would be reasonable to assume the existence of Chinese naval refuelling hubs beyond Djibouti (e.g., Port Sudan or Gwadar), or that the US and its allies have increased their rotational troop presence and weapons stockpiles in the Indo-Pacific under AUKUS+ or a strengthened QUAD framework.

On the **non-military side**, delegates may assume various diplomatic, economic, technological, and societal shifts that have taken place by 2030 and which influence multilateral stability. This includes the assumption that the United Nations Security Council remains operational, though likely gridlocked due to competing vetoes, and that *multilateral arms control platforms*, such as the **Conference on Disarmament (CD)** and the **NPT Review Conferences**, are in a state of paralysis or have suffered from erosion in compliance and credibility.

You may assume that global disarmament has lost momentum, and new coalitions whether among regional powers, ideological allies, or emerging military blocs have begun to act outside of UN frameworks to pursue their own interests. Assumptions may also reflect the growing trend of economic weaponization, such as the use of *rare earth embargoes, semiconductor supply chain blackmail, or maritime chokepoint disruption* as tools of hybrid warfare. It is also reasonable to assume an increase in cyber-influence campaigns, social media-driven unrest, or public backlash against defence escalations, all of which may shape how nations respond to crises. Moreover, the growing role of **private military companies (PMCs)** and **unregulated tech firms** can be incorporated into your assumptions as part of the non-state actor landscape.

However, there are clear boundaries. Delegates **must not assume** extreme or illogical events that break the internal realism of the committee. For example, you may not assume the **complete collapse of the UN**, the **existence of new imaginary countries**, or the **availability of science-fiction technologies** like teleportation, fully autonomous robot armies, or AI managing nuclear arsenals independently of human control. Similarly, nuclear warfare, if referenced, should be carefully escalated and only assumed as a last resort under grave provocation not as a starting point. The idea is to preserve the **authenticity and coherence** of this futuristic setting while allowing delegates the creativity to propose solutions that reflect where the world *could* be in five to six years.

When drafting directives, it is essential that all assumptions—whether military or non-military are **clearly implied or explained**. Delegates should be prepared to **justify their assumptions** if questioned by the Executive Board. For example, if your directive proposes using autonomous underwater drones for surveillance in the Red Sea, it should be based on an assumption that such technologies have been integrated into your country's naval doctrine by 2030, a claim that can be reasonably supported based on current trends. Likewise, if a delegate wishes to introduce a multilateral arms control proposal that excludes one of the P5 members, the directive must be grounded in the assumption that the existing arms treaties have fractured to such an extent that such realignment is both plausible and strategic.

While this study guide outlines several examples of potential military and non-military assumptions, delegates are not restricted to these alone. You are encouraged to think beyond what has been listed, as long as your assumptions are logically sound, contextually grounded in the timeline of 2029–2030, and remain within the realm of plausible international developments. Whether your assumption involves advanced weapon systems, unconventional alliances, cyber tactics, political disruptions, or socio-economic dynamics, it must be realistic and viable militarily or otherwise. These assumptions should be reflected only within your directives, and must be explicitly stated or clearly implied, so that they form part of your strategic reasoning and policy execution. Ultimately, we leave this interpretative space to the discretion of delegates, as part of what makes this a challenging and engaging committee.

In conclusion, assumptions are not loopholes they are **realistic projections** that help build a more engaging and complex crisis narrative. Delegates are expected to wield this tool responsibly. Creativity is welcomed, but only when built upon a **solid foundation of geopolitical realism, military plausibility, and diplomatic logic**. Use your assumptions to simulate the world not as it is, but as it is *likely to be*—a world where peace and power hang in delicate balance, and every decision shapes the global order to come.

TIMELINE

1 December 2029 – Global OSINT platforms publish high-resolution commercial satellite images showing over 130 newly constructed missile silos in the deserts of western China, notably in Xinjiang and Gansu provinces. These silos are built in symmetrical grid layouts and linked to hardened underground infrastructure. While China offers no official statement, U.S. military analysts claim the layout mimics older U.S. Cold War-era ICBM fields, hinting at a fundamental shift in China's strategic doctrine. The discovery sets off alarms across NATO, the Quad, and ASEAN nations.

7 December 2029 – In a rare show of unity, the ASEAN Regional Forum issues a communique calling for “full transparency in strategic nuclear deployments and missile field expansions” in the Indo-Pacific. While not naming China directly, the statement reflects deep unease within Southeast Asia. China dismisses the communique as “external interference orchestrated by the United States.”

15 December 2029 – The Pentagon announces an expanded logistics and deterrence posture across Guam, Palau, and northern Australia, including a rotational naval presence and pre-positioned supplies for rapid deployment forces. Japan and Australia express support, while India issues a cautious statement, urging “dialogue over deployments.” China's Foreign Ministry states that these actions are “thinly veiled attempts at encirclement.”

26 December 2029 – A scheduled military-to-military dialogue between Chinese and American officials in Singapore abruptly ends without agreement. China demands an end to U.S. maritime surveillance operations in the East China Sea and Indian Ocean, while the U.S. calls for verifiable limits on China's missile deployments. The talks collapse amid mutual accusations, and both delegations leave early.

3 January 2030 – China's PLA Navy begins a surprise three-day live-fire exercise in the Spratly Islands, involving multiple surface combatants and aircraft. Civilian maritime traffic is rerouted. The Philippines lodges a formal protest citing EEZ violations, while Vietnam issues a warning that “regional military activism must not override sovereign rights.” Tensions simmer further in Southeast Asia.

9 January 2030 – In a high-profile summit in Sochi, Russian President, hosts a trilateral security meeting with China and Iran. The joint statement from the summit emphasizes

“strategic synchronization and multipolar world order.” Western observers note the increasing alignment of non-Western powers around shared geopolitical objectives.

14 January 2030 – The French delegation at the United Nations introduces a proposal to convene a “Third Geneva Framework” to address missile proliferation, electronic warfare, and destabilizing military doctrines. The draft mentions the need to include non-NPT signatories and emerging regional powers. The U.S. backs the idea cautiously. China and Russia reject the proposal, calling it “ideologically weaponized diplomacy.”

23 January 2030 – A multinational maritime security task force operating near the Gulf of Aden intercepts a cargo vessel en route to Yemen. Inspections reveal dual-use electronics and encrypted navigation components. While the ship’s manifest lists commercial communications hardware, investigators suspect the cargo is linked to regional arms smuggling. China issues a statement condemning “unilateral interference in civilian trade.” Iran remains silent.

3 February 2030 – Iran test-fires a medium-range ballistic missile from central Iran, which lands in the eastern Arabian Sea. While the launch is announced as part of routine defense exercises, its range suggests the capability to target key U.S. and Indian naval installations. India issues a statement expressing “measured concern,” while Saudi Arabia raises alert levels across its coastal radar network.

13 February 2030 – Following Iranian activity and growing Chinese influence near Djibouti, NATO elevates its maritime presence in the Red Sea under a new readiness operation titled “Poseidon Sentinel.” France, Italy, and the UK each dispatch vessels to escort oil tankers transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. China warns that “foreign naval buildup undermines regional peace.”

20 February 2030 – India introduces a proposal for an “Indo-Pacific Military Transparency and Confidence Building Initiative” under the Shangri-La Dialogue, calling for the mutual notification of missile tests and naval exercises in shared waters. While ASEAN members support the idea, China refuses participation, saying the proposal reflects a “hegemonic framework under democratic disguise.”

28 February 2030 – China announces the activation of “multi-domain maritime surveillance operations” from its base in Port Sudan. Officially termed civilian infrastructure, these assets include long-range radar installations and unmanned surface vessels. France and Saudi Arabia

raise formal objections at the Arab League, citing the fragile security balance around the Red Sea.

10 March 2030 – A tense encounter occurs between a U.S. Navy destroyer and a Chinese frigate within the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The U.S. vessel attempts to redirect a Liberian-flagged ship allegedly involved in arms transport. China intervenes, and both navies conduct shadow operations for over 36 hours before disengaging. Media coverage leads to public concern over potential maritime clashes.

18 March 2030 – The French Navy’s communications systems onboard two of its Red Sea patrol vessels are briefly disabled by an external cyberattack. While systems are restored within hours, investigators trace the origin of the malware to IP nodes routed through East Asia. France does not formally accuse any state actor but calls it a “coordinated disruption of maritime security.”

27 March 2030 – Oman, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia jointly call on the UN Security Council to intervene in the “militarization of international commercial routes.” Their letter specifically references exercises, drone deployments, and electronic interference by “extra-regional actors.” The Security Council fails to reach consensus, with vetoes from China and Russia blocking any formal resolution.

4 April 2030 – Beijing and Tehran jointly announce week-long naval maneuvers titled “Operation Maritime Harmony” to begin in mid-April. The drills are described as “anti-piracy coordination,” but include live-fire segments and coordinated fleet operations across the southern Red Sea. NATO and Gulf Arab states respond with increased aerial and maritime surveillance.

16 April 2030 – An UN-hosted technical group on emerging arms control frameworks disbands after weeks of failed negotiation. The breakdown centres around disagreements on verification mechanisms and scope—specifically whether to include regional states like Iran, North Korea, and Israel. China accuses the West of double standards, and the U.S. walks out after proposed transparency measures are rejected.

24 April 2030 – A civilian oil tanker flagged to Singapore is accidentally struck by naval debris during simultaneous U.S. and Chinese fleet movements in the Red Sea. The incident causes a minor oil spill and delays commercial traffic. Insurance costs for commercial vessels spike. Singapore issues a demarche to both parties, demanding deconfliction protocols.

1 May 2030 – During overlapping naval operations near Port Sudan, a French FREMM-class frigate and a Chinese Type 055 destroyer nearly collide amid radar jamming, miscommunication, and signal confusion. Several sailors are injured on both sides, and key communications equipment on the French vessel is damaged. Both sides issue competing narratives. China claims it was a case of “deliberate maritime aggression,” while France and the U.S. attribute the incident to Chinese interference. An emergency UN Security Council session ends in stalemate due to multiple vetoes. Within 48 hours, global commercial shipping halts in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Oil futures surge by 30%.

KINDLY NOTE

1. Only, the timeline which is created, can be referenced in the committee using this study guide. The created timeline is just a foundational set of events which will help us to simulate the crisis, however any and all further events will be undertaken by the actions you take in the directives.
2. At the same time, the background guide shall only stand as a guide of references, and not the ultimate research.
3. *The mentioned points in the study guide **does not challenge** the position or stance of any nation and is only meant as a **source of kick-starting research** by understanding the basis of the agenda. The position, perception and view of the country/delegate can/could vary from the background guide and is acceptable.*
4. Develop **technical** understanding towards the agenda and be well researched.
5. *Understand that this shall be a CCC and its vital for you to not just be on the point with technical solutions but also to uphold the national interest such that your foreign policy is altered in a way that it upscales your national interests. Also understanding the agenda and the very ambit of crisis, your priority should be the exploit the resources in hand i.e., the mandate, powers and scope of the committee.*
6. Most importantly familiarize yourself with the existing geopolitical and geographical landscape of the world, as the crisis and its updates shall be directly or indirectly related to it. Thereof, to improvise your prompt action, documentation and augmentation in committee you are recommended to understand the problem-oriented landscape of the World at the same time, your neighbourhood and the solutions required to solve it.